Le modèle social au risque de la gouvernance économique

The analysis of the consequences of the 2007-2008 financial crisis on the economic and monetary union (euro crisis, sovereign debt crisis, banking crisis, economic recession, etc.) often starts from an economic or political point of view. The resulting debates are for example on the relevance of austerity policies, on how to boost growth, etc. One particular point of view is often overlooked: the institutional perspective. In this paper, the author takes as his starting point the question as to whether the institutional balance of economic and monetary union is optimal (or not) in the context of the crisis. This (im)balance includes especially the question of the sharing of responsibilities within the EU institutions and between these institutions and the Member States. What is - or should be, according to the treaties - the responsibility of the Member States, the European Commission and the European Central Bank to promote growth and employment? The author concludes that this division is currently sub-optimal, which results in a considerable reduction in the scope of policies. Ultimately, this leads the European institutions and the Member States to restrict their means of action to structural reforms. This has resulted in a collapse of the social dimension of the European project, as it is transformed into a variable of adjustment to economic shocks. This follows from (a lack of) political choices behind institutional imbalances, and could be corrected by giving Europe real social governance and adjustment instruments.