Mécanismes de sécurisation des revenus pour les travailleurs précaires et qualité des relations sociales : une étude expérimentale

This paper presents the results of an economic experiment simulating the functioning of a dual labor market. The stylized economy is presented to participants in a contextualized manner, featuring ?permanent? and ?temporary? workers collaborating repeatedly to produce a public good within companies. We compare the contributions of ?permanent? and ?temporary? workers and measure the impact of implementing mechanisms to secure the income of precarious workers (unemployment insurance, precariousness premium) on their contribution to the public good, as well as on interpersonal trust. The presence of temporary and permanent workers does not affect the overall performance of our economy nor the average propensity to contribute to the public good. Although reducing inequalities during the experiment could theoretically promote an environment which promotes cooperation, the implementation of these measures, notably through the imposition of taxes or the introduction of bonuses exclusively for precarious workers, alters individual incentives to contribute. We find that income security measures for precarious workers tend to weaken cooperative behaviors in our experimental setting. We also observe that participants place more trust in permanent workers than in temporary workers. J.E.L. Codes : J6, D02, D91