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Social and Nonlinear Tariffs on Drinking Water: cui bono? Empirical Evidence from a Natural Experiment in France

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  • Alexandre Mayol

Abstract

This empirical study discusses both the incentive and redistributive effects of nonlinear tariffs on the drinking water of developed countries. Using an original panel database based on a natural experience with drinking water in France, we econometrically explore the impact of tariffs changes on consumption (linear versus nonlinear). We demonstrate that this measure reduces global consumption. However, small consumers ( 75 m3) decreases. Public policy implications of such tariffs on drinking water may lead to a discussion on the design of these tariffs and the quality of the information given on water consumption.

Suggested Citation

  • Alexandre Mayol, 2017. "Social and Nonlinear Tariffs on Drinking Water: cui bono? Empirical Evidence from a Natural Experiment in France," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 127(6), pages 1161-1185.
  • Handle: RePEc:cai:repdal:redp_276_1161
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    Cited by:

    1. Alexandre Mayol & Carine Staropoli, 2021. "Giving consumers too many choices: a false good idea? A lab experiment on water and electricity tariffs," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 51(2), pages 383-410, April.
    2. Marie-Estelle Binet & María Ángeles García-Valiñas & Michel Paul, 2020. "Price perception under blocks tariff schemes : a comparison of drinking water consumption beliefs and behaviors and recommandations for efficient nudging policies," Post-Print hal-03192716, HAL.

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