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Forte stabilité et vainqueur de Condorcet

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  • Abdoul Aziz Ndiaye

Abstract

In this paper, we return to the strongly candidate stability criterion of Dutta, Jackson and Le Breton [2001]. More specifically, a voting rule is called strongly candidate stable if the winner of the election remains unchanged after the attempted manipulation by strategic candidacy of a potential candidate. In the case of an election to a committee with three candidates, we show that a voting rule is strongly candidate stable if it selects the Condorcet winner. We evaluate then the sensitivity of the amendment procedure, the successive elimination rule and plurality to the strongly candidate stability under impartial anonymous culture (IAC).

Suggested Citation

  • Abdoul Aziz Ndiaye, 2013. "Forte stabilité et vainqueur de Condorcet," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 123(5), pages 793-808.
    • Handle: RePEc:cai:repdal:redp_235_0793
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