Limitation des déficits publics et efficacité des politiques budgétaires européennes un exercice de simulation économétrique

Are fiscal rules able to make fiscal policies more effective? On the one hand, fiscal rules can reduce the risk of debt crises and, more generally, they can make fiscal policy more legible. On the other hand, explicit deficit ceilings can thwart the stabilising effect of changes in fiscal stances by increasing rational reactions. In this paper, we shall try to measure the fiscal policy effectiveness by simulating the impact of different fiscal rules in an output equation. We shall estimate fiscal rules followed by EMU governments on two sub-periods: before and after the institution of public deficit ceilings. Fiscal rule estimates provide indicators of systematic fiscal policy changes and unexpected fiscal shocks.Using counterfactual simulations with bootstrapping techniques we shall replicate systematic changes and fiscal shocks all along the period. The introduction of the simulated fiscal policy indicators in an output equation allows for measuring fiscal multipliers. Results suggest that the introduction of deficit ceilings have diminished the fiscal policy reaction to cyclical movement. It also has enhanced the degree of inertia in the primary balance. Without public deficit limitations systematic fiscal policy produces negative effects on output in most of the EMU countries. Fiscal ?surprises? are the only way for the government to succeed in managing macro-activity in the short run. On the contrary, disciplined fiscal rules since the 90?s have produced Keynesian effects, while deviations from that rule are destabilising.