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Dissuasion du crime et concurrence entre juridictions

Author

Listed:
  • Nicolas Marceau
  • Steeve Mongrain

Abstract

This paper studies competition in of crime deterrence between jurisdictions. It considers a world such that criminals can chose the jurisdiction in which they operate. To protect its allocation, every jurisdiction invests in deterrence to reduce benefits of criminal benefits on its territory and to incite criminals to locate in another jurisdiction. We characterize the different equilibria, symetric and asymetric, which can appear in such a world. We demonstrate that when there is no cooperation between jurisdictions, the only possible efficient equilibria are asymmetric. Classification du JEL: K42

Suggested Citation

  • Nicolas Marceau & Steeve Mongrain, 2002. "Dissuasion du crime et concurrence entre juridictions," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 112(6), pages 905-919.
    • Handle: RePEc:cai:repdal:redp_126_0905
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    Cited by:

    1. Marceau, Nicolas & Mongrain, Steeve, 2011. "Competition in law enforcement and capital allocation," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 136-147, January.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    interjurisdictional competition; crime; deterrence;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

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