Un modèle de tarification comportementale du marché du crédit renouvelable

?We present a behavioral pricing model of the revolving credit market. Rational lenders take advantage of time-inconsistent customers using short term contracts that can be renewed at the cost of paying a penalty fee. Penalty fees have a dual role : they increase market share by providing a useful commitment device to time-inconsistent but otherwise rational borrowers; they are also a source of revenue from the semi-naive borrowers who understand the need for commitment but fail to forecast their future time discount factor. Perfect competition does not eliminate predatory practices, since the equilibrium contract entails a subsidized (below marginal cost) short-term loan that can only be profitable if a fraction of the borrowers end up paying the penaltyfee. We show that our model can account for the evolution of the pricing strategies of the U.S. credit card companies in the last thirty years. ?