La finance non réglementée et le négoce international des matières premières

For numbers of politicians, commentators and regulators, it is politically correct to be ready to reinforce the bank and finance regulations and to discover non-regulated activities liable of having systemic implications. The large commodities trading houses could be the next ?too big to fail? threat. The economic importance of international commodities traders (oil, energy, metal, agricultural products) has been increasing for the last 30 years. In 2012, Vitol had a 297 billion dollars revenue, negotiating a daily average production of 5,5 million barrels of oil. In 2011, the Glencore turn over reached 186 billion dollars and its profit went beyond 5 billion dollars. In 2012, this trading house bought Xstrata, the third most important mining company in the world. Since 2007, this growth was partly done at the expense of the trading operations of the big investment banks. At all times, the international commercial banks (mostly European) were the main financing sources of the trading commodities houses, but since 2008-2009, the traders have sought for new financial resources they have found in the capital markets (IPO and bonds) and among sovereign wealth funds. The Dodd Frank Act and the Basle 3 regulations account for this weakening of the investment and commercial banks to the benefit of large commodities trading houses and the capital markets. The commodities trading houses are becoming so important that some regulators have foretold a systemic risk. This fear seems exaggerated. Indeed, the trading houses are not in the middle of so complex and interconnected financial relations as those maintained by CME Group, Intercontinental Exchange and the 28 international banks pointed out by the Financial Stability Board. Classification JEL: F23, F65, G18, Q13.