IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/cai/refaef/ecofi_105_0309.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Agences de notation et conflits d'intérêts

Author

Listed:
  • Aline Darbellay
  • Frank Partnoy

Abstract

While the creation of the credit rating industry traces back to the beginning of the twentieth century, conflicts of interest have emerged particularly since the 1970s, and they escalated in the run-up to the subprime mortgage crisis. In the 1970s, the leading credit rating agencies shifted from an investor-pays to an issuer-pays business model, i.e. issuers that were willing to be rated started to hire the agencies. This shift has been best explained by the quasi-regulatory role given to the leading agencies by regulators in the United States and later worldwide. Consequently, the leading credit rating agencies Moody?s, Standard & Poor?s and Fitch have become increasingly profitable. However, numerous rating scandals during the recent financial crisis highlighted the fact that credit ratings have in fact little informational value as compared to the significant revenues they generate. This paradoxal situation gives rise to concern about the lack of regulatory oversight in the credit rating industry and the need of monitoring conflicts of interest. In the United States, the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 partly addresses these concerns in its credit rating agency reform. Classification JEL: G01, G24, G28.

Suggested Citation

  • Aline Darbellay & Frank Partnoy, 2012. "Agences de notation et conflits d'intérêts," Revue d'économie financière, Association d'économie financière, vol. 0(1), pages 309-318.
  • Handle: RePEc:cai:refaef:ecofi_105_0309
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.cairn.info/load_pdf.php?ID_ARTICLE=ECOFI_105_0309
    Download Restriction: free

    File URL: http://www.cairn.info/revue-d-economie-financiere-2012-1-page-309.htm
    Download Restriction: free
    ---><---

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G24 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cai:refaef:ecofi_105_0309. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Jean-Baptiste de Vathaire (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.cairn.info/revue-d-economie-financiere.htm .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.