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14. Le contrat de travail unique : quid pro quo ou simple quiproquo ?

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  • Nicolas Lepage-Saucier
  • Juliette Schleich
  • Étienne Wasmer

Abstract

Although the single employment contract is not popular among both representatives of workers and company leaders, the proposal for a single labour contract, created with the goal of reducing dualism, has paradoxically remained at the forefront of debates on the need for reform of the labour market. At first glance, the single employment contract seems to be an attractive response to the issue of dualism. However, upon looking more closely, it appears that a single contract would not resolve problems linked to precariousness and the consequences of employment protection. Most of the time, alternative policies could be more efficient. Moreover, while there are costs to dualism, these are not as obvious and well established as the ones triggered by employment protection itself. Finally, suppressing temporary contracts would lead, at a constant level of employment protection, to important job losses, given that not all temporary jobs would become permanent jobs. A drastic reform of employment protection provided by this single employment contract would be needed. Such a reform does not need to be linked to the creation of a new employment contract: counterparts in terms of unemployment insurance or firm­sponsored training are possible.

Suggested Citation

  • Nicolas Lepage-Saucier & Juliette Schleich & Étienne Wasmer, 2013. "14. Le contrat de travail unique : quid pro quo ou simple quiproquo ?," Regards croisés sur l'économie, La Découverte, vol. 0(1), pages 263-277.
  • Handle: RePEc:cai:rcedec:rce_013_0263
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    Cited by:

    1. Normann Rion, 2019. "Waiting for the Prince Charming: Fixed-Term Contracts as Stopgaps," Working Papers halshs-02331887, HAL.

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