Fuite des cerveaux, gain de cerveaux et politique d’éducation optimale : implications pour le bien-être des non-migrants

A greater investment in education (h) is an optimal ex-ante response to a brain drain (BD). However, sending country governments must deal with the ex-post situation of residents with higher h but who failed to migrate. And though a net brain gain has been viewed as a benefit and referred to as a ?beneficial brain drain? in the literature, its welfare impact for source country residents is at best ambiguous. Increased educational investment in response to a BD is equivalent to a bet where migrants (M) win and the impact on residents (R)?whose welfare is a concern for the government?is ambiguous or negative. I compare residents? welfare for an open vs. a closed economy, a) under the presence or absence of an education externality, b) with or without government intervention, and c) with the government?s concern equal for R and M (R = M) or greater for R (R > M). The main findings are: i) residents are worse off under an open economy in most scenarios, with an ambiguous result under an externality and no intervention; ii) optimal education policy under an externality has a positive (ambiguous) impact on residents? welfare under a closed (open) economy; iii) residents? welfare is higher under intervention for R > M than for R = M ; and iv) an increase in the immigration policy?s degree of skill-selectivity reduces residents? welfare. One policy implication is that subsidizing higher education, which is optimal under an education externality in a closed economy, is not necessarily optimal under an open economy.