La crise du statut de l'agent comptable dans les organismes de Sécurité sociale : le cas des caisses d'allocations familiales

The financial and accounting management of the social security bodies is based in France on the principle of the separation between the functions of the director (the official with power to authorise expenditure) and those of the accountant, and, since 1993, on the principle of cooperation between the former and the latter in what regards internal control. On the basis of weaknesses that were reported on this internal control system (reports to the Parliament of 1999, 2002 and 2003), we have undertaken a qualitative study in four family allowance offices. The accountant, who is answerable for the application of the law, is under the hierarchical authority of a board of directors, that has been itself marginalised. He depends on the director in terms of resources and promotion. Does the ambiguity of his role and status and the inherent conflicts of rationality doom the attempts to establish an internal control to failure ; or, on the contrary, does this ambiguity, by allowing the reinterpretation of what internal control is about, unexpectedly favours the emergence of a network of agents, whose project is precisely the achievement of internal control ?