A Rhetorical Response to Boldrin & Levine: Against Intellectual (Property) Extremism

The two sides of the contemporary debate over intellectual property agree that the law needs to “strike a balance” between providing sufficient incentive for creation and the freedom to make use of existing ideas. Michele Boldrin and David Levine, on the other hand, boldly declare in their recent work “Against Intellectual Monopoly” that they have arrived at conclusions that “are at variance with both sides.” In this commentary, I examine 1) their assertion that intellectual property should be viewed as an “intellectual monopoly”; 2) their claim to have mustered evidence and authorities showing that innovators and creators can be well protected in the absence of intellectual property law; and 3) their rhetorical practices throughout the book. I conclude that 1) their assertion that intellectual property constitutes an “intellectual monopoly” is itself a bad analogy and an example of the logical fallacy of hasty generalization; 2) the evidence and authorities they muster in support of their claim that innovators and creators can be well protected in the absence of intellectual property law are unpersuasive, as they actually tend to support the opposite conclusion; and 3) their book as a whole is an example of bad rhetorical argumentation.