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Multiple Equilibria and Equilibrium Selection in the Crime Commission Game

Author

Listed:
  • Baker Matthew J.

    (Department of Economics, Hunter College, City University of New York, New York, USA)

  • Miceli Thomas J.

    (Department of Economics, University of Connecticut, Storrs, CT, USA)

Abstract

The deterrence function of criminal punishment relies on the credibility of enforcers to carry out threatened sanctions. That credibility may be suspect when enforcers face budgetary constraints, especially if the realized crime rate is high. This leads to the potential for multiple equilibria in the “crime commission game” – one involving a low crime rate, and one involving a high crime rate. The latter potentially arises because a high rate of crimes may overwhelm the ability of enforcers to apprehend offenders, thus leading to a self-fulfilling outcome. When multiple equilibria are possible, the question of which one is “selected” has practical as well as theoretical relevance. The paper assesses the implications of various selection criteria, including payoff dominance, risk dominance, and the global games approach. The conclusions highlight the role of the credibility of punishment in deterring crime, and also shed light on the interpretation of data on crime and punishment.

Suggested Citation

  • Baker Matthew J. & Miceli Thomas J., 2024. "Multiple Equilibria and Equilibrium Selection in the Crime Commission Game," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 20(3), pages 403-412.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:rlecon:v:20:y:2024:i:3:p:403-412:n:1006
    DOI: 10.1515/rle-2024-0113
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    crime and punishment; multiple equilibria; equilibrium selection;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • K14 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Criminal Law
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

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