Zehn Jahre nach dem Konkurs von Lehman Brothers: Ordnungspolitische Irrtümer in der Bewertung der EZB-Geldpolitik seit der globalen Finanzkrise

Since the default of Lehman Brothers, the German public has been highly critical of the monetary policy of the European Central Bank (ECB). As early as during the crisis management of 2008/2009, monetary policy measures violated basic ordoliberal principles, namely the principle of liability (Haftungsprinzip) and the principle of the primacy of the monetary order (Primat der Währungspolitik). Since the euro crisis in 2010 the degree of criticism from economists, journalists and politicians has reached unprecedented heights, coupled with constant warnings and forecasts of impending inflation, financial instability, economic weakness and other extreme risks. None of them have materialized. In this paper, Adalbert Winkler argues that the critics have been misled by key weaknesses of a crude ordoliberal perspective, namely the inability to distinguish between crises caused by insolvency and crises caused by illiquidity, as well as the equation of monetary stability with the use (or non-use) of certain monetary policy instruments rather than the achievement of the goal of price stability. A critical reflection of these weaknesses is urgently needed rather than pointing to the undefined far-distant future when it is claimed that the ordoliberal predictions will finally hold.