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Das optimale Design von Auktionen als Teil einer modernen Ordnungspolitik: Zum Ökonomie-Nobelpreis 2020 für Robert Wilson und Paul Milgrom

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  • Haucap Justus

    (Düsseldorfer Institut für Wettbewerbsökonomie, Heinrich-Heine-Universität DüsseldorfDüsseldorfGermany)

Abstract

The article discusses the research of Robert Wilson and Paul Milgrom, who were jointly awarded the so-called Nobel Prize in Economics in 2020 for their contributions to auction theory and the development of new auction formats. After a brief presentation of important elementary auction formats, the contributions of the two laureates are discussed in detail. In conclusion, the article concludes that Milgrom and Wilson's research program on so-called market design is not a contrast to Ordnungspolitik, but rather is itself part of modern Ordnungspolitik with the aim of shaping economic institutions and also market rules in such a way that the most efficient allocation of scarce resources is achieved in both the short and long term.

Suggested Citation

  • Haucap Justus, 2020. "Das optimale Design von Auktionen als Teil einer modernen Ordnungspolitik: Zum Ökonomie-Nobelpreis 2020 für Robert Wilson und Paul Milgrom," ORDO. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, De Gruyter, vol. 71(1), pages 347-362, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:ordojb:v:71:y:2020:i:1:p:347-362:n:22
    DOI: 10.1515/ordo-2021-0015
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    Keywords

    Auction Theory; Nobel Prize; Spectrum Auctions; Ordnungspolitik; Auktionstheorie; Nobelpreis; Frequenzauktionen; Ordnungspolitik; Auction Theory; Nobel Prize; Spectrum Auctions; Ordnungspolitik;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
    • L96 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Telecommunications

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