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Komplexität im Steuerrecht – Zentrale politökonomische Theorien im Lichte einer empirischen Ursachenforschung mit Hilfe von Process Tracing / Tax complexity in emergence – pivotal political-economic theories revisited in the light of a process tracing field study

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  • Grottke Markus
  • Kittl Maximilian

Abstract

Our paper presents the results of a detailed study of the legislatory process within the German tax simplification act passed in 2011. We carve out influence factors on tax complexity within the legislatory process which are beneficial or detrimental to tax simplification. The comparison of the results with pivotal existing political-economic literature on the formation of tax law and tax complexity reveals how and when the arguments of the latter play a role in the processes observed. Further remarkable factors like the (biasing) influence of the press, incomplete information and ideological struggles are observed.

Suggested Citation

  • Grottke Markus & Kittl Maximilian, 2013. "Komplexität im Steuerrecht – Zentrale politökonomische Theorien im Lichte einer empirischen Ursachenforschung mit Hilfe von Process Tracing / Tax complexity in emergence – pivotal political-economic t," ORDO. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, De Gruyter, vol. 64(1), pages 163-194, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:ordojb:v:64:y:2013:i:1:p:163-194:n:10
    DOI: 10.1515/ordo-2013-0110
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    References listed on IDEAS

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