Die „Verfassung für Europa“ - Bemerkungen zu einem ordnungspolitischen Dauerproblem

Subject of the present analysis is the draft of a constitution for Europe, proposed by the „Convention for the future of Europe“. At first (part 1), the structure of the proposal will be dealt with. It turns out to be a puzzling, unusually long document consisting of titles provisions, protocols and articles which runs counter to the conventions objective to make the European Union more transparent for its citizens. In part 2, one of the declared objectives of the constitution will be taken up and it will be argued that it represents a confusion with a conception of economic policy, the so-called social market economy. This is followed by an analysis of the constitutional status of the European Commission (part 3). According to the draft proposal, the Commission will become the most powerful authority of the EU because no constitutional safeguards are provided which can be employed to check and to control the use of its powers. This will prove to be a fundamental deficit in democracy of the EU when the proposed constitution will be accepted. In the final part (4), the perspectives will be explored which result for the EU when it is dealing with its various tasks as stipulated in the proposal. Starting from the deficit in democracy, it will be pleaded that the proposed constitution should be subjected to a referendum in the present as well as the new member countries in order to strengthen the legitimacy of the constitution and to induce European politicians to enter into a clarifying discussion of the project of a constitution for Europe.