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Large-Scale Land Acquisitions, Commitment Problems and International Law

Author

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  • Diergarten Yorck

    (University of Freiburg, Institute of Public Law, Chair of Public International Law and Comparative Law (Prof. Silja Vöneky), Platz der Alten Synagoge 1, 79085 Freiburg, Germany)

  • Krieger Tim

    (University of Freiburg, Department of Economics, Wilfried Guth Chair of Constitutional Political Economy and Competition Policy, Wilhelmstr. 1b, 79085 Freiburg, Germany CESifo, Munich, Germany)

Abstract

Developing countries with weak institutions often face severe commitment problems. International investors are reluctant to invest in these countries because their property rights are insufficiently protected. We argue that in order to overcome the commitment problem countries may subject investors’ rights protection to independent investment tribunals. These tribunals are known to strictly support property rights protection and to be reluctant to honor human rights considerations, although they might be applicable. This may explain why human rights of the local smallholders in large-scale land acquisitions are hardly protected in the Global South.

Suggested Citation

  • Diergarten Yorck & Krieger Tim, 2015. "Large-Scale Land Acquisitions, Commitment Problems and International Law," The Law and Development Review, De Gruyter, vol. 8(1), pages 217-233, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:lawdev:v:8:y:2015:i:1:p:217-233:n:5
    DOI: 10.1515/ldr-2015-0007
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    3. Matthias Bujko & Christian Fischer & Tim Krieger & Daniel Meierrieks, 2016. "How Institutions Shape Land Deals: The Role of Corruption," Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, Springer, vol. 33(3), pages 205-217, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Tim Krieger & Martin Leroch, 2016. "The Political Economy of Land Grabbing," Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, Springer, vol. 33(3), pages 197-204, October.
    2. Tim Krieger & Daniel Meierrieks, 2016. "Land Grabbing and Ethnic Conflict," Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, Springer, vol. 33(3), pages 243-260, October.
    3. Koroso, Nesru H. & Zevenbergen, Jaap A. & Lengoiboni, Monica, 2019. "Land institutions’ credibility: Analyzing the role of complementary institutions," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 553-564.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    large-scale land acquisitions; land grabbing; law &; economics; international law; property rights; commitment problems; foreign investors; weak institutions; investment tribunals;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F21 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - International Investment; Long-Term Capital Movements
    • F53 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations
    • K33 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - International Law
    • O13 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Agriculture; Natural Resources; Environment; Other Primary Products
    • Q15 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Land Ownership and Tenure; Land Reform; Land Use; Irrigation; Agriculture and Environment

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