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A New Type of Evolutionary Strategy Based on a Multi-player Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma Game

Author

Listed:
  • Xie Nenggang

    (School of Management Science and Engineering, Anhui University of Technology, Ma’anshan, 243002, China)

  • Ye Ye

    (School of Mechanical Engineering, Anhui University of Technology, Ma’anshan, 243002, China)

  • Bao Wei

    (School of Management Science and Engineering, Anhui University of Technology, Ma’anshan, 243002, China)

  • Wang Meng

    (School of Business, Anhui University of Technology, Ma’anshan, 243002, China)

Abstract

According to the philosophy of self-cultivation that “one should refine his personal virtue when in poverty, and help save the world when in success”, a new type of evolutionary strategy, Poor-Competition-Rich-Cooperation (PCRC), is proposed. To discuss its superiority and inferiority, based on a multi-player iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma game, PCRC and other six kinds of strategies are played by using the roulette method in three different populations (a uniformly distributed population, a cooperation-preference population, a defection-preference population). The payoff characteristics for each strategy under different temptation coefficients and noise values are also analyzed. Simulation results indicate that PCRC has a sufficient robustness and its payoff presents a basically monotonic increasing tendency with the increment of noise. The superiority of PCRC becomes more obvious when the temptation coefficient becomes larger. Furthermore, a higher population preference for defection yields a more obvious advantage for PCRC.

Suggested Citation

  • Xie Nenggang & Ye Ye & Bao Wei & Wang Meng, 2020. "A New Type of Evolutionary Strategy Based on a Multi-player Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma Game," Journal of Systems Science and Information, De Gruyter, vol. 8(1), pages 67-81, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:jossai:v:8:y:2020:i:1:p:67-81:n:5
    DOI: 10.21078/JSSI-2020-067-15
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    References listed on IDEAS

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