A Lost Game of Bank Bargains: West Germany and International Banking Regulation between Bretton Woods and Basel I (1972–1988)

Current theories of financial regulation suggest expanding rules-based formal state intervention to promote international banking stability. Such policy solutions should then be global in scope. This article instead argues that principles-based informal co- and self-regulation through domestic (gentlemen’s) agreements underpinned West German bank internationalisation until the 1980s. The analytic narrative approach allows the tracing of the social dynamics of the German politics of regulation, drawing on unused primary sources: Coalitions between the German regulating and regulated actors were bolstered by a liberal domestic framework and bespoke national policies. In contrast, regulatory harmonisation through international prudential standards came with high domestic adjustment costs for the German banking sector. Thus, domestic makeshift solutions to deal with and internalise cross-border financial risks proved most workable.