IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bpj/glecon/v10y2010i1n6.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The Obama Administration and the U.S. Financial Crisis

Author

Listed:
  • Rehman Scheherazade S.

    (The George Washington University)

Abstract

There has been tremendous pressure on the Obama Administration to justify the actions taken with regards to the U.S. financial crisis which has managed to eliminate, overnight, over a quarter of the middle class wealth and leave one in six adults without a job or underemployed, while generating a bailout debt that was unimaginable in scale and scope only five years ago. In response to this public pressure, in mid-June 2009, the Obama Administration issued a white paper titled "Financial Regulatory Reform - A New Foundation: Rebuilding Financial Supervision and Regulation" (published by the U.S. Department of Treasury) covering a wide range of areas of financial regulation that proposed a new architecture for financial supervision. Although the White Paper touches upon many of the Administration's promised responses to the crisis with regards to new financial regulations and supervisory changes, it has been criticized as being too narrow in the scope and breath needed to manage the sheer size and scale of the impact of the U.S. financial crisis. This paper focuses on ten concerns and issues of note with the Obama Administration's actions and responses to date with regards to the U.S. financial/banking crisis and its 2009 White Paper on "Financial Regulatory Reform." They are as follows: (1) No Discussion and Minimal Attempt by the Administration to Relay Their Understanding of and Global Transmission of This Financial Crisis, (2) Proposed Financial Oversight Council, (3) Increased Powers for the Federal Reserve, (4) Most Recommendations Do Not Follow the Trend Toward Supervision Consolidation, (5) Macroeconomic vs. Microeconomic Supervision, (6) Government in the Financial Markets and Industry, (7) No Significant International Standard Setting or Coordination to Date, (8) Issue of Too Big to Fail Still at Large, (9) Obama Administration's PR Debacle, and (10) Something to Show after Spending $1.4 Trillion Plus.

Suggested Citation

  • Rehman Scheherazade S., 2010. "The Obama Administration and the U.S. Financial Crisis," Global Economy Journal, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-24, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:bpj:glecon:v:10:y:2010:i:1:n:6
    DOI: 10.2202/1524-5861.1613
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.2202/1524-5861.1613
    Download Restriction: For access to full text, subscription to the journal or payment for the individual article is required.

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.2202/1524-5861.1613?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Lucia Dalla Pellegrina & Donato Masciandaro, 2008. "Politicians, central banks, and the shape of financial supervision architectures," Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 16(4), pages 290-317, November.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Gupta Vipin, 2011. "Corporate Response to Global Financial Crisis: A Knowledge-Based Model," Global Economy Journal, De Gruyter, vol. 11(2), pages 1-17, July.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Donato Masciandaro & Davide Romelli, 2019. "Behavioral Monetary Policymaking: Economics, Political Economy and Psychology," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Behavioral Finance The Coming of Age, chapter 9, pages 285-329, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    2. Donato Masciandaro & Maria J. Nieto & Marc Quintyn, 2011. "Will They Sing the Same Tune? Measuring Convergence in the New European System of Financial Supervisors," Chapters, in: Sylvester Eijffinger & Donato Masciandaro (ed.), Handbook of Central Banking, Financial Regulation and Supervision, chapter 17, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    3. Federico Favaretto & Donato Masciandaro, 2022. "Populism, financial crises and banking policies: Economics and psychology," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 69(4), pages 441-464, September.
    4. Richard Brophy, 2012. "Development of insurance regulation in Ireland," Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 20(3), pages 248-263, July.
    5. Dalla Pellegrina, L. & Masciandaro, D. & Pansini, R.V., 2013. "The central banker as prudential supervisor: Does independence matter?," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 9(3), pages 415-427.
    6. Donato Masciandaro & Marc Quintyn, 2010. "Institutions Matter: Financial Supervision Architecture, Central Bank and Path-Dependence. General Trends and the South Eastern European Countries," South-Eastern Europe Journal of Economics, Association of Economic Universities of South and Eastern Europe and the Black Sea Region, vol. 8(1), pages 7-53.
    7. Favaretto, Federico & Masciandaro, Donato, 2016. "Doves, hawks and pigeons: Behavioral monetary policy and interest rate inertia," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 27(C), pages 50-58.
    8. Jakub Gren & David Howarth & Lucia Quaglia, 2015. "Supranational Banking Supervision in Europe: The Construction of a Credible Watchdog," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53, pages 181-199, September.
    9. Lucia Dalla Pellegrina & Donato Masciandaro & Rosaria Vega Pansini, 2011. "New Advantages of Tying One’s Hands: Banking Supervision, Monetary Policy and Central Bank Independence," Chapters, in: Sylvester Eijffinger & Donato Masciandaro (ed.), Handbook of Central Banking, Financial Regulation and Supervision, chapter 8, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    10. Ovidiu Stoica & Delia-Elena DiaconaÅŸu, 2012. "Regional Economic Integration And National Financial Supervision. A Comparative Study," Annales Universitatis Apulensis Series Oeconomica, Faculty of Sciences, "1 Decembrie 1918" University, Alba Iulia, vol. 2(14), pages 1-23.
    11. L. Dalla Pellegrina & D. Masciandaro & R. Pansini, 2014. "Do exchange rate regimes affect the role of central banks as banking supervisors?," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 38(2), pages 279-315, October.
    12. Donato Masciandaro & Marc Quintyn, 2011. "Regulating the Regulators: The Changing Face of Financial Supervision Architectures Before and After the Financial Crisis," Chapters, in: Sylvester Eijffinger & Donato Masciandaro (ed.), Handbook of Central Banking, Financial Regulation and Supervision, chapter 16, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    13. Ovidiu Stoica & Roxana Scantee, 2012. "Financial Supervision and Banking Competition in European Union," Acta Universitatis Danubius. OEconomica, Danubius University of Galati, issue 8(6), pages 56-66, December.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Obama; U.S. financial crisis;

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bpj:glecon:v:10:y:2010:i:1:n:6. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Peter Golla (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.degruyter.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.