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State-Dependent Forward Guidance and the Problem of Inconsistent Announcements

Author

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  • Parra-Polania Julian A.

    (Banco de la República de Colombia,Bogotá, Colombia)

Abstract

Forward guidance can be provided as an unconditional promise, i.e. commitment to a specific low policy rate. Alternatively, the promise may include an escape clause, i.e. a condition defining the state of the economy under which the central bank would not keep such a low rate and, instead, it would revert to setting policy under discretion. The escape clause can be expressed as a threshold in terms of a specific variable. The present paper shows that, when such a threshold is expressed in terms of an endogenous variable (e.g. output, inflation), there are cases where it becomes impossible for the central bank to act in a way that is consistent with its promise. Consistency imposes limits on the policy rate that can be set since reverting immediately to the optimal discretionary rate can be incompatible with exceeding the threshold.

Suggested Citation

  • Parra-Polania Julian A., 2019. "State-Dependent Forward Guidance and the Problem of Inconsistent Announcements," German Economic Review, De Gruyter, vol. 20(4), pages 1019-1027, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:germec:v:20:y:2019:i:4:p:e1019-e1027
    DOI: 10.1111/geer.12201
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Maria Lucia Florez-Jimenez & Julian A. Parra-Polania, 2016. "Forward guidance with an escape clause: when half a promise is better than a full one," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 48(15), pages 1372-1381, March.
    2. Coenen, Günter & Ehrmann, Michael & Gaballo, Gaetano & Hoffmann, Peter & Nakov, Anton & Nardelli, Stefano & Persson, Eric & Strasser, Georg H., 2017. "Communication of monetary policy in unconventional times," CFS Working Paper Series 578, Center for Financial Studies (CFS).
    3. Feroli, Michael & Greenlaw, David & Hooper, Peter & Mishkin, Frederic S. & Sufi, Amir, 2017. "Language after liftoff: Fed communication away from the zero lower bound," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(3), pages 452-490.
    4. Stephen J. Cole, 2020. "The Limits of Central Bank forward Guidance under Learning," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 16(4), pages 199-250, September.
    5. Boneva, Lena & Harrison, Richard & Waldron, Matt, 2015. "Threshold-based forward guidance: hedging the zero bound," Bank of England working papers 561, Bank of England.
    6. Boneva, Lena & Harrison, Richard & Waldron, Matt, 2018. "Threshold-based forward guidance," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 138-155.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    forward guidance; zero lower bound; central bank announcements; monetary policy; threshold;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • E37 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Forecasting and Simulation: Models and Applications

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