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Contagion of Self-Interested Behavior: Evidence from Group Dictator Game Experiments

Author

Listed:
  • Ito Takehiro

    (Faculty of Policy Studies, Iwate Prefectural University, Sugo, Takizawa,Iwate, Japan)

  • Suzuki Akihiro

    (Faculty of Literature and Social Sciences, Yamagata University, Chome-4-12 Kojirakawamachi,Yamagata, Japan)

  • Takemoto Toru

    (Faculty of Economics, Tezukayama University, 7 Chome-1-1 Tezukayama,Nara, Japan)

  • Ogawa Kazuhito

    (Center for Experimental Economics, Faculty of Sociology, Kansai University, 3 Chome-3-35 Yamatecho, Suita,Osaka, Japan)

  • Takahashi Hiromasa

    (Faculty of International Studies, Hiroshima City University, 3 Chome-4-1 Ozukahigashi, Asaminami Ward,Hiroshima, Japan)

Abstract

We examine how group decision-making affects other-regarding behavior in experimental dictator games. In particular, we assess whether the effects of iterated games differ for group and individual decision-making and whether the difference in decision-making style (individual or group) changes the perception of social identity. We make two findings on group decision-making. First, group decisions become more selfish when repeating the game after changing group members. Second, a dictator group donates more to a recipient group at the same university than to a recipient group at a different university. These findings are not true for individual decision-making.

Suggested Citation

  • Ito Takehiro & Suzuki Akihiro & Takemoto Toru & Ogawa Kazuhito & Takahashi Hiromasa, 2016. "Contagion of Self-Interested Behavior: Evidence from Group Dictator Game Experiments," German Economic Review, De Gruyter, vol. 17(4), pages 425-437, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:germec:v:17:y:2016:i:4:p:425-437
    DOI: 10.1111/geer.12077
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    Cited by:

    1. Adam Ayaita & Kerstin Pull, 2022. "Positional preferences and narcissism: evidence from ‘money burning’ dictator games," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 29(3), pages 267-271, February.

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