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A Game-Theoretic Foundation for Competitive Equilibria in the Stiglitz–Weiss Model

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  • Arnold Lutz G.

    (University of Regensburg,Regensburg, Germany)

Abstract

Financial intermediaries are, by definition, engaged in two-sided competition. Despite the well-known problems of achieving competitive solutions under twosided price competition, models of financial intermediation are commonly solved for competitive equilibria. This article provides a game-theoretic foundation for competitive equilibria in one of the most important models of financial intermediation, the seminal Stiglitz-Weiss (1981) adverse selection model of the credit market with a continuum of borrower types.

Suggested Citation

  • Arnold Lutz G., 2012. "A Game-Theoretic Foundation for Competitive Equilibria in the Stiglitz–Weiss Model," German Economic Review, De Gruyter, vol. 13(2), pages 211-227, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:germec:v:13:y:2012:i:2:p:211-227
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0475.2011.00552.x
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