IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bpj/germec/v13y2012i1p21-40.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Monetary Policy Delegation and Transparency of Policy Targets: A Positive Analysis

Author

Listed:
  • Hielscher Kai

    (Helmut Schmidt University,Hamburg, Germany)

Abstract

We show that, in a two-stage model of monetary policy with stochastic policy targets and asymmetric information, the transparency regime chosen by the central bank does never coincide with the regime preferred by society. Independent of society’s endogenous choice of delegation, the central bank reveals its inflation target and conceals its output target. In contrast, society would prefer either transparency or opacity of both targets. As a conclusion, the choice of the transparency regime should be part of the optimal delegation solution.

Suggested Citation

  • Hielscher Kai, 2012. "Monetary Policy Delegation and Transparency of Policy Targets: A Positive Analysis," German Economic Review, De Gruyter, vol. 13(1), pages 21-40, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:germec:v:13:y:2012:i:1:p:21-40
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0475.2011.00537.x
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0475.2011.00537.x
    Download Restriction: For access to full text, subscription to the journal or payment for the individual article is required.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/j.1468-0475.2011.00537.x?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bpj:germec:v:13:y:2012:i:1:p:21-40. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Peter Golla (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.degruyter.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.