`Me-Too' Innovation in Pharmaceutical Markets
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DOI: 10.2202/1558-9544.1138
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Other versions of this item:
- Anupam B. Jena & John E. Calfee & Edward C. Mansley & Tomas J. Philipson, 2009. ""Me-Too" Innovation in Pharmaceutical Markets," NBER Chapters, in: Frontiers in Health Policy Research, volume 12, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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Cited by:
- Michael Mueller & Alexander Frenzel, 2015. "Competitive pricing within pharmaceutical classes: evidence on “follow-on” drugs in Germany 1993–2008," The European Journal of Health Economics, Springer;Deutsche Gesellschaft für Gesundheitsökonomie (DGGÖ), vol. 16(1), pages 73-82, January.
- McKellar Michael R. & Frank Matthew & Huskamp Haiden & Chernew Michael E., 2012. "The Value of Patent Expiration," Forum for Health Economics & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 15(1), pages 1-13, November.
- John Rizzo & Richard Zeckhauser, 2009.
"Generic script share and the price of brand-name drugs: the role of consumer choice,"
International Journal of Health Economics and Management, Springer, vol. 9(3), pages 291-316, September.
- Rizzo, John & Zeckhauser, Richard Jay, 2012. "Generic Script Share and the Price of Brand-Name Drugs: The Role of Consumer Choice," Scholarly Articles 8057977, Harvard Kennedy School of Government.
- Siotis, Georges & Ornaghi, Carmine & Castanheira, Micael, 2019.
"Market Definition and Competition Policy Enforcement in the Pharmaceutical Industry,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
14035, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Georges Siotis & Carmine Ornaghi & Micael Castanheira De Moura, 2020. "Market Definition and Competition Policy Enforcement in the Pharmaceutical Industry," Working Papers ECARES 2020-49, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Hostenkamp, Gisela, 2013. "Do follow-on therapeutic substitutes induce price competition between hospital medicines? Evidence from the Danish hospital sector," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 111(1), pages 68-77.
- Siotis, Georges & Castanheira, Micael & de Frutos, Maria-Angeles & Ornaghi, Carmine, 2017. "The Unexpected Consequences of Asymmetric Competition. An Application to Big Pharma," CEPR Discussion Papers 11813, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, 2020. "Investing in Ex Ante Regulation: Evidence from Pharmaceutical Patent Examination," NBER Working Papers 27579, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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Keywords
innovation; pharmaceuticals; “me-too” drugs;All these keywords.
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