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The ECB Under the Threat of Fiscal Dominance – The Individual Central Banker Dimension

Author

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  • Heinemann Friedrich

    (ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, Mannheim, Germany)

  • Kemper Jan

    (ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, Mannheim, Germany)

Abstract

This paper examines the threat of fiscal dominance for central banks with a focus on the individual dimension. A general symptom of fiscal dominance is a feedback loop from sovereign debt developments to monetary policy decisions. Our theoretical reasoning clarifies under which assumptions the individual members in a federal central bank system should pay particular attention to their home regions’ public debt situation. We present empirical evidence for the existence of such a repercussion in the context of the ECB Council. Based on public statements regarding the Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme (PEPP), we classify the governors of the euro area national central banks (NCB) and the ECB board members as “hawks”, “neutrals,” and “doves”. We correlate the resulting classification with their home countries’ debt level. The resulting pattern is consistent with what can be expected for a regime of fiscal dominance. Whereas the doves tend to come from high-debt countries, the average debt level of the hawks’ home countries is significantly lower. As expected, this pattern is even more pronounced for the NCB presidents than for board members.

Suggested Citation

  • Heinemann Friedrich & Kemper Jan, 2021. "The ECB Under the Threat of Fiscal Dominance – The Individual Central Banker Dimension," The Economists' Voice, De Gruyter, vol. 18(1), pages 5-30, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:evoice:v:18:y:2021:i:1:p:5-30:n:2
    DOI: 10.1515/ev-2021-0014
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Leek, Lauren Caroline & Bischl, Simeon & Freier, Maximilian, 2024. "Introducing Textual Measures of Central Bank Policy-Linkages Using ChatGPT," SocArXiv 78wnp, Center for Open Science.
    2. Jost, Thomas & Tödter, Karl-Heinz, 2021. "Reducing sovereign debt levels in the post-Covid Eurozone with a simple deficit rule," IMFS Working Paper Series 164, Goethe University Frankfurt, Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability (IMFS).
    3. Leek, Lauren Caroline & Bischl, Simeon & Freier, Maximilian, 2024. "Introducing Textual Measures of Central Bank Policy-Linkages Using ChatGPT," SocArXiv 78wnp_v1, Center for Open Science.
    4. Kaminskas, Rokas & Jurkšas, Linas, 2024. "ECB communication sentiments: How do they relate to the economic environment and financial markets?," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 131(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    PSPP; PEPP; central bank independence; political economy of central banking;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H63 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt
    • E42 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Monetary Sytsems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System
    • H12 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Crisis Management

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