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Too Many Banks to Fail? Theory and Evidence

Author

Listed:
  • Boyd John

    (Banking Industry of Minnesota Chair, Carlson School of Management, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN, USA)

  • Baxamusa Mufaddal

    (Opus College of Business at the University of St Thomas, Minnesota, St Paul, MN, USA)

Abstract

“Too Many to Fail” suggests that small and medium sized banks can cause a banking crisis if a large number of them fail simultaneously. We disagree and show that the fundamental cause of systemic banking crises is “Too Big to Fail” banks.

Suggested Citation

  • Boyd John & Baxamusa Mufaddal, 2013. "Too Many Banks to Fail? Theory and Evidence," The Economists' Voice, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 7-13, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:evoice:v:10:y:2013:i:1:p:7-13:n:4
    DOI: 10.1515/ev-2013-0015
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Acharya, Viral V., 2009. "A theory of systemic risk and design of prudential bank regulation," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 224-255, September.
    2. Acharya, Viral V. & Yorulmazer, Tanju, 2007. "Too many to fail--An analysis of time-inconsistency in bank closure policies," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 1-31, January.
    3. Viral V. Acharya & Tanju Yorulmazer, 2008. "Information Contagion and Bank Herding," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 40(1), pages 215-231, February.
    4. Viral V. Acharya & Tanju Yorulmazer, 2008. "Cash-in-the-Market Pricing and Optimal Resolution of Bank Failures," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 21(6), pages 2705-2742, November.
    5. O'Hara, Maureen & Shaw, Wayne, 1990. "Deposit Insurance and Wealth Effects: The Value of Being "Too Big to Fail."," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 45(5), pages 1587-1600, December.
    6. Douglas W. Diamond, 1984. "Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 51(3), pages 393-414.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Keywords

    Banking crisis; too many to fail;

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