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Expert Panels with Selective Investigation

Author

Listed:
  • Gong Qiang

    (Wenlan School of Business, Zhongnan University of Economics and Law, Wuhan, China)

  • Yang Huanxing

    (Department of Economics, Ohio State University, 1945 N. High St., Columbus, OH 43210, USA)

Abstract

In a model of information disclosure with multiple experts we compare homogeneous panels and diverse panels. The distinguishing feature of our model is selective investigation: there are multiple aspects relevant to decision making and each expert can strategically choose some aspects to investigate. We show that homogeneous panels lead to unbalanced investigation and unbalanced action, while under diverse panels both investigations and actions are balanced. In most circumstances, diverse panels perform better than homogeneous panels.

Suggested Citation

  • Gong Qiang & Yang Huanxing, 2022. "Expert Panels with Selective Investigation," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 22(2), pages 369-404, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:22:y:2022:i:2:p:369-404:n:1
    DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2021-0010
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    information disclosure; multiple aspects; selective investigation; panel design;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • L20 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - General

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