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The Core in Bertrand Oligopoly TU-Games with Transferable Technologies

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  • Lardon Aymeric

    (Université Côte d’Azur, CNRS, GREDEG, Valbonne, France)

Abstract

In this article we study Bertrand oligopoly TU-games with transferable technologies under the α and β-approaches. We first prove that the core of any game can be partially characterized by associating a Bertrand oligopoly TU-game derived from the most efficient technology. Such a game turns to be an efficient convex cover of the original one. This result implies that the core is non-empty and contains a subset of payoff vectors with a symmetric geometric structure easy to compute. We also deduce from this result that the equal division solution is a core selector satisfying the coalitional monotonicity property on this set of games. Moreover, although the convexity property does not always hold even for standard Bertrand oligopolies, we show that it is satisfied when the difference between the marginal cost of the most efficient firm and the one of the least efficient firm is not too large.

Suggested Citation

  • Lardon Aymeric, 2020. "The Core in Bertrand Oligopoly TU-Games with Transferable Technologies," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 20(1), pages 1-10, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:20:y:2020:i:1:p:10:n:11
    DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2018-0197
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    Cited by:

    1. Aymeric Lardon, 2018. "Convexity of Bertrand oligopoly TU-games with differentiated products," Post-Print halshs-00544056, HAL.
    2. Algaba, Encarnación & Béal, Sylvain & Fragnelli, Vito & Llorca, Natividad & Sánchez-Soriano, Joaquin, 2019. "Relationship between labeled network games and other cooperative games arising from attributes situations," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 185(C).
    3. Aymeric Lardon, 2020. "Convexity of Bertrand oligopoly TU-games with differentiated products," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 287(1), pages 285-302, April.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bertrand oligopoly TU-games; transferable technologies; core; convexity property;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection

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