IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bpj/bejtec/v18y2018i1p6n11.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Uniform Pricing and Product Innovation

Author

Listed:
  • Matteucci Giorgio

    (Dipartimento di Ingegneria informatica automatica e gestionale Antonio Ruberti, Sapienza – Università di Roma, Via Ariosto, 25 – 00185Roma, Italia)

  • Reverberi Pierfrancesco

    (Dipartimento di Ingegneria informatica automatica e gestionale Antonio Ruberti, Sapienza – Università di Roma, Via Ariosto, 25 – 00185Roma, Italia)

Abstract

We consider the rationale for imposing uniform pricing (UP) on a monopolist in a two-market model with endogenous quality. In contrast to the literature, we find that UP may yield higher quality than third-degree price discrimination (PD). This occurs when the demand dispersion between markets is sufficiently decreasing with quality. A simple test for a higher quality under UP is to check whether an increase in quality reduces the price differential between markets under PD. In this case, a higher quality under UP is an effective substitute for PD to extract consumer surplus. When the demand dispersion is small enough, a higher quality under UP increases social welfare relative to PD.

Suggested Citation

  • Matteucci Giorgio & Reverberi Pierfrancesco, 2018. "Uniform Pricing and Product Innovation," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 18(1), pages 1-6, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:18:y:2018:i:1:p:6:n:11
    DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2016-0110
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2016-0110
    Download Restriction: For access to full text, subscription to the journal or payment for the individual article is required.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1515/bejte-2016-0110?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Schmalensee, Richard, 1981. "Output and Welfare Implications of Monopolistic Third-Degree Price Discrimination," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(1), pages 242-247, March.
    2. Layson, Stephen K, 1994. "Market Opening under Third-Degree Price Discrimination," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(3), pages 335-340, September.
    3. Ikeda, Takeshi & Toshimitsu, Tsuyoshi, 2010. "Third-degree price discrimination, quality choice, and welfare," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 106(1), pages 54-56, January.
    4. Malueg, David A. & Schwartz, Marius, 1994. "Parallel imports, demand dispersion, and international price discrimination," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(3-4), pages 167-195, November.
    5. Justin P. Johnson & David P. Myatt, 2006. "On the Simple Economics of Advertising, Marketing, and Product Design," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(3), pages 756-784, June.
    6. Nguyen, Xuan, 2014. "Monopolistic third-degree price discrimination under vertical product differentiation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 125(2), pages 153-155.
    7. Valletti, Tommaso M., 2006. "Differential pricing, parallel trade, and the incentive to invest," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 314-324, September.
    8. Alexandrov, Alexei & Deb, Joyee, 2012. "Price discrimination and investment incentives," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 30(6), pages 615-623.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Francisco Galera & Pedro Mendi & Juan Carlos Molero, 2017. "Quality Differences, Third-Degree Price Discrimination, And Welfare," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 55(1), pages 339-351, January.
    2. Torben Klarl, 2018. "Complementarity of willingness to pay and cost heterogeneity under vertical product differentiation: A welfare analysis," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 28(3), pages 591-607, August.
    3. Xingtang Wang & Lin Zhang, 2022. "Monopolistic third-degree price discrimination, welfare, and vertical market structure," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 26(1), pages 75-86, March.
    4. Braouezec, Yann, 2016. "On the welfare effects of regulating the number of discriminatory prices," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(4), pages 588-607.
    5. Alexandrov, Alexei & Deb, Joyee, 2012. "Price discrimination and investment incentives," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 30(6), pages 615-623.
    6. Frank Müller-Langer, 2009. "Does Parallel Trade Freedom Harm Consumers in Small Markets?," Croatian Economic Survey, The Institute of Economics, Zagreb, vol. 11(1), pages 11-41, April.
    7. Giorgio Matteucci & Pierfrancesco Reverberi, 2013. "Parallel trade, product quality, and welfare," DIAG Technical Reports 2013-14, Department of Computer, Control and Management Engineering, Universita' degli Studi di Roma "La Sapienza".
    8. Hornbeck, Richard A., 2005. "Price Discrimination and Smuggling of AIDS Drugs," Scholarly Articles 11186012, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    9. Giorgio Gnecco & Fabio Pammolli & Berna Tuncay, 2022. "Welfare and research and development incentive effects of uniform and differential pricing schemes," Computational Management Science, Springer, vol. 19(2), pages 229-268, June.
    10. Zhu Wang & Julian Wright, 2018. "Should platforms be allowed to charge ad valorem fees?," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 66(3), pages 739-760, September.
    11. Matteucci, Giorgio & Reverberi, Pierfrancesco, 2014. "Parallel trade, product quality, and welfare," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 122(2), pages 258-262.
    12. Francisco Galera & Pedro Mendi & Juan Carlos Molero, 2017. "Seasonality, price discrimination, and welfare," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 120(3), pages 269-277, April.
    13. Geng, Difei & Saggi, Kamal, 2017. "International effects of national regulations: External reference pricing and price controls," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 68-84.
    14. Xuan Nguyen & Chi†Chur Chao & Pasquale Sgro & Munirul Nabin, 2017. "Cross†border Travellers and Parallel Trade: Implications for Asian Economies," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 40(8), pages 1531-1546, August.
    15. Tsuyoshi Toshimitsu, 2014. "Economic Integration, Quality Choice, and Monopoly," Discussion Paper Series 118, School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University, revised May 2014.
    16. Geng, Difei & Saggi, Kamal, 2020. "Optimal price regulations in international pharmaceutical markets with generic competition," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(C).
    17. Kamal Saggi, 2016. "Trade, Intellectual Property Rights, and the World Trade Organization," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 16-00014, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
    18. Takanori Adachi & Noriaki Matsushima, 2014. "The Welfare Effects Of Third-Degree Price Discrimination In A Differentiated Oligopoly," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 52(3), pages 1231-1244, July.
    19. Stefan Felder, 2004. "Drug price regulation under consumer moral hazard," The European Journal of Health Economics, Springer;Deutsche Gesellschaft für Gesundheitsökonomie (DGGÖ), vol. 5(4), pages 324-329, November.
    20. Kamal Saggi, 2014. "Regional exhaustion of intellectual property," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 10(1), pages 125-137, March.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    monopoly; third-degree price discrimination; uniform pricing; endogenous quality; R&D investment;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Monopoly
    • L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:18:y:2018:i:1:p:6:n:11. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Peter Golla (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.degruyter.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.