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Contestable Licensing

Author

Listed:
  • Neeman Zvika

    (Boston University and Hebrew University)

  • Orosel Gerhard Oskar

    (University of Vienna)

Abstract

We analyze a model of repeated franchise bidding for natural monopoly with contestable licensing -- a franchisee holds an (exclusive) license to operate a franchise until another firm offers to pay more for it. In a world where quality is observable but not verifiable, the simple regulatory scheme we describe combines market-like incentives with regulatory oversight to generate efficient outcomes.

Suggested Citation

  • Neeman Zvika & Orosel Gerhard Oskar, 2004. "Contestable Licensing," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 3(1), pages 1-20, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:bejeap:v:contributions.3:y:2004:i:1:n:1
    DOI: 10.2202/1538-0645.1129
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    Keywords

    franchise bidding; natural monopoly; regulation; contestable markets; quality;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Monopoly
    • D45 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Rationing; Licensing
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation

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