IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bpj/bejeap/vadvances.5y2005i1n6.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Optimal Taxation with Cournot Oligopoly

Author

Listed:
  • Reinhorn Leslie J.

    (University of Durham, reinhorn@hotmail.com)

Abstract

This paper studies optimal linear taxation in a general equilibrium model with Cournot oligopoly. The main result is the following. With imperfect competition the tendency toward "inverse elasticities" tax rules will be weakened and may even be reversed. That is, an upward sloping relationship may exist between an industry's optimal tax rate and its own-price elasticity of demand, unlike the perfectly competitive case.

Suggested Citation

  • Reinhorn Leslie J., 2005. "Optimal Taxation with Cournot Oligopoly," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 5(1), pages 1-29, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:bejeap:v:advances.5:y:2005:i:1:n:6
    DOI: 10.1515/1538-0637.1165
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/1538-0637.1165
    Download Restriction: For access to full text, subscription to the journal or payment for the individual article is required.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1515/1538-0637.1165?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Bertrand Crettez & Pierre-André Jouvet & Ludovic A. Julien, 2014. "Tax Policy in a Simple General Oligopoly Equilibrium Model with Pollution Permits," Working Papers 1413, Chaire Economie du climat.
    2. GRAZZINI, Lisa, 2000. "Ad valorem and per unit taxation in an oligopoly model," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2000054, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    3. Olivia Kay, 2024. "Cournot Duopoly with Cost Asymmetry and Balanced Budget Specific Taxes and Subsidies," Games, MDPI, vol. 15(4), pages 1-10, August.
    4. Stamatopoulos, Giorgos, 2019. "A strategic tax mechanism," MPRA Paper 93602, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Květa Kubátová, 2009. "Optimal Taxation - Review of Theory [Optimální zdanění - přehled dosavadní teorie]," Český finanční a účetní časopis, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2009(3), pages 24-36.
    6. François Boldron & Cyril Hariton, 2003. "Access charge and imperfect competition," Recherches économiques de Louvain, De Boeck Université, vol. 69(3), pages 319-340.
    7. François Boldron, 2003. "Le choix entre taxe unitaire et taxe ad valorem," Revue Française d'Économie, Programme National Persée, vol. 17(3), pages 109-128.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Optimal taxation; Cournot oligopoly;

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bpj:bejeap:v:advances.5:y:2005:i:1:n:6. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Peter Golla (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.degruyter.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.