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Resource Allocation with Spatial Externalities: Experiments on Land Consolidation

Author

Listed:
  • Tanaka Tomomi

    (California Institute of Technology)

Abstract

This paper compares the performance of a two-sided combinatorial call market, direct negotiation, and double auction for consolidating fragmented land. Experimental results suggest direct negotiation produces higher efficiencies than other mechanisms. The combinatorial call market tends to alleviate the exposure problem, and performs well when 1) swapping is easily agreeable, and 2) the number of subjects and commodities are increased and the initial endowments are unchallenging. The two-sided combinatorial call market, however, suffers from the holdout problem when the number of subjects and commodities is small.

Suggested Citation

  • Tanaka Tomomi, 2007. "Resource Allocation with Spatial Externalities: Experiments on Land Consolidation," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 7(1), pages 1-33, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:bejeap:v:7:y:2007:i:1:n:7
    DOI: 10.2202/1935-1682.1622
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Cadigan, John & Schmitt, Pamela & Shupp, Robert & Swope, Kurtis, 2011. "The holdout problem and urban sprawl: Experimental evidence," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 72-81, January.
    2. Arimoto, Yutaka & Nakajima, Shinsaku & Tomita, Kohji, 2016. "Farmland Consolidation by Plot Exchange : A Simulation-based Approach," Japanese Journal of Agricultural Economics (formerly Japanese Journal of Rural Economics), Agricultural Economics Society of Japan (AESJ), vol. 18.
    3. John Cadigan & Pamela Schmitt & Robert Shupp & Kurtis Swope, 2009. "An Experimental Study of the Holdout Problem in a Multilateral Bargaining Game," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 76(2), pages 444-457, October.
    4. Daniel Ayalew Ali & Klaus Deininger & Loraine Ronchi, 2019. "Costs and Benefits of Land Fragmentation: Evidence from Rwanda," The World Bank Economic Review, World Bank, vol. 33(3), pages 750-771.
    5. Swope, Kurtis J. & Cadigan, John & Schmitt, Pamela, 2014. "That's my final offer! Bargaining behavior with costly delay and credible commitment," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 49(C), pages 44-53.
    6. Deininger, Klaus & Savastano, Sara & Carletto, Calogero, 2012. "Land Fragmentation, Cropland Abandonment, and Land Market Operation in Albania," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 40(10), pages 2108-2122.
    7. Klaus Deininger & Daniel Monchuk & Hari K Nagarajan & Sudhir K Singh, 2017. "Does Land Fragmentation Increase the Cost of Cultivation? Evidence from India," Journal of Development Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 53(1), pages 82-98, January.
    8. Hirota, Shinichi & Suzuki-Löffelholz, Kumi & Udagawa, Daisuke, 2020. "Does owners’ purchase price affect rent offered? Experimental evidence," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance, Elsevier, vol. 25(C).
    9. Chia, Liu Ee & Sing, Tien Foo, 2023. "Redevelopment values in multi-family properties: Evidence from en bloc sales in Singapore," Journal of Housing Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(C).
    10. Simanti Banerjee & Anthony Kwasnica & James Shortle, 2015. "Information and Auction Performance: A Laboratory Study of Conservation Auctions for Spatially Contiguous Land Management," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 61(3), pages 409-431, July.
    11. Isaac, R. Mark & Kitchens, Carl & Portillo, Javier E., 2016. "Can buyer “mobility” reduce aggregation failures in land-assembly?," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 16-30.
    12. Arthur Zillante & Peter M. Schwarz & Dustin C. Read, 2014. "Land Aggregation Using Contingent and Guaranteed Payments," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 80(3), pages 702-727, January.
    13. Gu, Yiquan & Lord, Alexander & Eika, Anders & Dethier, Perrine & Samsura, D. Ary A. & Nordahl, Berit Irene & Sommervoll, Dag Einar & van der Krabben, Erwin & Halleux, Jean-Marie, 2021. "Fair shares? Advancing land economics through cooperative game theory," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 106(C).
    14. Chaturvedi, Rakesh & Kanjilal, Kiriti, 2021. "Experimental analysis of a land assembly mechanism," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 91(C).
    15. Zillante, Artie & Read, Dustin C. & Seiler, Michael J., 2020. "Assembling land for urban revitalization in the presence of linchpin parcels and information asymmetries: An experimental investigation," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 99(C).

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