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The Role of Judges in Selecting Efficient Norms in a Common Law System: A Law and Economics Perspective

Author

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  • Padre Diogo Augusto Vidal

    (Law School, 28127 Universidade de Brasilia , Campus Darci Ribeiro, Asa Norte, Brasilia 70910-900, DF, Brazil)

  • Rêgo Leandro Chaves

    (Statistics and Applied Math Department, 28121 Federal University of Ceara , Fortaleza, CE, Brazil)

Abstract

This study delves into the common law efficiency theory, proposing that the efficiency of legal norms in common law systems predominantly depends on judges’ biases towards efficiency. By developing an economic model, it is demonstrated that the proportion of efficient norms correlates with the predisposition of judges towards efficiency, influenced by their personal beliefs. Historical analysis of common and civil law systems reveals that neither inherently guarantees efficiency; rather, their efficiency is contingent upon their adaptability to societal needs and prevailing judicial ideologies. The paper concludes that the efficiency of a legal system relies on its congruence with societal values and judicial ideologies, emphasizing that shifts in the judiciary’s ideological makeup have implications on legal system efficiency. This research contributes to a deeper understanding of the multifaceted process shaping legal norms in common law, highlighting the critical role of judges, societal values, and legislative dynamics.

Suggested Citation

  • Padre Diogo Augusto Vidal & Rêgo Leandro Chaves, 2024. "The Role of Judges in Selecting Efficient Norms in a Common Law System: A Law and Economics Perspective," Asian Journal of Law and Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 15(3), pages 303-330.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:ajlecn:v:15:y:2024:i:3:p:303-330:n:1006
    DOI: 10.1515/ajle-2023-0179
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    common law; legal efficiency; judicial bias; law evolution; comparative legal systems;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • B40 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology - - - General
    • K00 - Law and Economics - - General - - - General (including Data Sources and Description)
    • K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process

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