Democratic Central Banking: Power Not Deliberation: In response to Monnet

Eric Monnet’s piece, “Democratic consequences of the insurance functions of central banks,” starts in exactly the right place. Monnet acutely observes some of the most fundamental issues with the dominant contemporary monetary policymaking regime. Most foundationally, he observes a gap between what central banks do and how they are legitimized. The consequence, in short, is a failure of the contemporary regime to justify itself on democratic terms. To overcome this failure, Monnet proposes an institutional reform—establishing a European Credit Council (ECC). He defends this proposal by appeal to democratic theory, particularly the literature on democratic theory that prizes ‘good deliberation’. While there is nothing wrong with Monnet’s claim that establishing an ECC would likely improve the quality of deliberation about the role of central banks, and in so doing, produce better policy, I argue here that this view misses something essential. Democracy requires more than accountability, transparency, and good deliberation. It requires democratic power: the power of the people and their elected officials to steer policy. Adopting this view of democracy, in contrast to the deliberative democratic view Monnet embraces, suggests a different set of required reforms. Instead of establishing an independent credit council, I suggest that we should be vesting stronger monetary policy guidance powers in existing democratic legislative bodies.