IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/blv/journl/v5y2002i1p123-156.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Sesgos de política económica cuando las autoridades fiscales y monetarias tienen objetivos diferentes

Author

Listed:
  • Herman Bennet

    (Banco Central de Chile)

  • Norman Loayza O.

    (Banco Central de Chile)

Abstract

La pregunta que se aborda en este trabajo es qué sesgos de política económica pueden ocurrir cuando las autoridades monetarias y las fiscales tienen preferencias distintas en cuanto a la importancia de cerrar las brechas de producción e inflación generadas por shocks adversos. Para cumplir con dicho objetivo, el presente estudio utiliza un modelo de teoría de juegos en el cual las autoridades fiscales y monetarias interactúan para estabilizar la economía, teniendo diferentes preferencias y controlando distintos instrumentos de política. Modelada ya sea como un equilibrio tipo Nash o tipo Stackelberg, la ausencia de coordinación de políticas macroeconómicas implica que un aumento en la divergencia de preferencias entre las autoridades fiscales y monetarias, lleva, ceteris paribus, a mayores déficit fiscales (el instrumento de política de la autoridad fiscal) y a mayores tasas de interés real (el instrumento del Banco Central). La sección empírica de este trabajo provee evidencia a favor de esta conclusión en una muestra de panel de 19 países industrializados con información anual para el período 1970-94. El estudio concluye que reformas de segunda generación que faciliten la coordinación de políticas pueden aliviar los sesgos de excesivo conservadurismo de la autoridad monetaria y liberalismo de la autoridad fiscal.

Suggested Citation

  • Herman Bennet & Norman Loayza O., 2002. "Sesgos de política económica cuando las autoridades fiscales y monetarias tienen objetivos diferentes," Revista de Análisis del BCB, Banco Central de Bolivia, vol. 5(1), pages 123-156, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:blv:journl:v:5:y:2002:i:1:p:123-156
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.bcb.gob.bo/webdocs/publicacionesbcb/revista_analisis/ra_vol0501/articulo_7_v5_1.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://www.bcb.gob.bo/?q=pub_revista-analisis
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. William D. Nordhaus, 1994. "Policy games: Coordination and Independece in Monetary and Fiscal Policies," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 25(2), pages 139-216.
    2. Loewy, Michael B, 1988. "Reaganomics and Reputation Revisited," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 26(2), pages 253-263, April.
    3. Cukierman Alex, 1992. "CENTRAL BANK STRATEGY, CREDIBILITY, AND INDEPENDANCE: THEORY AND EVIDENCE: Compte Rendu par Dominique Cariofillo," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, vol. 3(4), pages 581-590, December.
    4. Walsh, Carl E., 1993. "Central bank strategies, credibility, and independence : A review essay," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 287-302, November.
    5. Alex Cukierman, 1992. "Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence: Theory and Evidence," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262031981, April.
    6. Schmidt-Hebbel, Klaus & Tapia, Matias, 2002. "Inflation targeting in Chile," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 125-146, August.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Herman Bennett & Norman Loayza, 2002. "Policy Biases when the Monetary and Fiscal Authorities Have Different Objectives," Central Banking, Analysis, and Economic Policies Book Series, in: Norman Loayza & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel & Norman Loayza (Series Editor) & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel (Series (ed.),Monetary Policy: Rules and Transmission Mechanisms, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 11, pages 299-330, Central Bank of Chile.
    2. Norman Loayza & Herman Bennett, 2004. "Policy Biases under Lack of Coordination," Econometric Society 2004 Latin American Meetings 349, Econometric Society.
    3. Stephen G Cecchetti & Alfonso Flores-Lagunes & Stefan Krause, 2005. "Assessing the Sources of Changes in the Volatility of Real Growth," RBA Annual Conference Volume (Discontinued), in: Christopher Kent & David Norman (ed.),The Changing Nature of the Business Cycle, Reserve Bank of Australia.
    4. Federico Ravenna, 2005. "The European Monetary Union as a Commitment Device for New EU Member States," Working Papers 98, Oesterreichische Nationalbank (Austrian Central Bank).
    5. Antonio Fatás & Ilian Mihov & Andrew K. Rose, 2007. "Quantitative Goals for Monetary Policy," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 39(5), pages 1163-1176, August.
    6. Mas, Ignacio, 1995. "Central bank independence: A critical view from a developing country perspective," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 23(10), pages 1639-1652, October.
    7. Marc Bassoni & André Cartapanis, 1995. "Autonomie des banques centrales et performances macro-économiques : Un réexamen," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 46(2), pages 415-432.
    8. Ehrmann, Michael & Tzamourani, Panagiota, 2012. "Memories of high inflation," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 174-191.
    9. Cukierman, Alex, 2008. "Central bank independence and monetary policymaking institutions -- Past, present and future," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 722-736, December.
    10. Marcelo Ochoa & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel, 2006. "El Banco Central de Chile en Comparación con los Bancos Centrales del Mundo," Working Papers Central Bank of Chile 367, Central Bank of Chile.
    11. Mas, Ignacio, 1994. "Central bank independence : a critical view," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1356, The World Bank.
    12. Andrew Hughes Hallett & Nicola Viegi, 2003. "Imperfect transparency and the strategic use of information: an ever present temptation for central bankers?," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 71(5), pages 498-520, September.
    13. Stephen G. Cecchetti & Stefan Krause, 2002. "Central bank structure, policy efficiency, and macroeconomic performance: exploring empirical relationships," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, vol. 84(Jul), pages 47-60.
    14. Lohmann, Susanne, 1997. "Partisan control of the money supply and decentralized appointment powers," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 225-246, May.
    15. William Miles, 2009. "Central Bank Independence, Inflation and Uncertainty: The Case of Colombia," International Economic Journal, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 23(1), pages 65-79.
    16. Martin Cerisola & Gaston Gelos, 2009. "What drives inflation expectations in Brazil? An empirical analysis," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 41(10), pages 1215-1227.
    17. Cukierman, Alex & Spiegel, Yossi & Leiderman, Leonardo, 2004. "The choice of exchange rate bands: balancing credibility and flexibility," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 379-408, March.
    18. Francesca Castellani & Xavier Debrun, 2005. "Designing Macroeconomic Frameworks: A Positive Analysis of Monetary and Fiscal Delegation," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 8(1), pages 87-117, March.
    19. M.A. Akhtar, 1995. "Monetary policy goals and central bank independence," Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, vol. 48(195), pages 423-439.
    20. Carlo Cambini & Yossi Spiegel, 2016. "Investment and Capital Structure of Partially Private Regulated Firms," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(2), pages 487-515, April.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    política monetaria; política fiscal; coordinación; Nash; Stackelberg; países industrializados; datos de panel; independencia de bancos centrales; metas de inflación;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E5 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit
    • E6 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:blv:journl:v:5:y:2002:i:1:p:123-156. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Jose Antonio Caballero Pelaez (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/bcbgvbo.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.