Some Remarks on Reforming WTO AD/CVD Rules

In these remarks, I argue that a plausible reason that anti‐dumping actions are so widely abused for protectionist purposes is that they represent a rare instance of essentially unilateral actions that are permissible within the WTO: under the banner of anti‐dumping actions, governments can block imports and provide their industries with import relief without fear of retaliation or demands for compensation from their trading partners. Cognisant of the great potential for abuse of anti‐dumping actions, the WTO Agreement on Implementation of Article VI represents an extraordinarily detailed attempt by WTO member governments to ‘reign in’ this potential through a detailed set of rules governing the acceptable methodologies and procedures for initiating anti‐dumping actions. But as long as the underlying incentives for abuse remain, governments are likely to continue to find new and increasingly ingenious ways to respond to these incentives without running afoul of the rules. To create incentives for the use of anti‐dumping measures that are more in line with a cooperative international environment, I suggest extending WTO compensation provisions to cover anti‐dumping actions. In this way, the WTO might in effect ‘harness retaliation’ and convert it into a tool of international order in the area of anti‐dumping actions.