Why Does the Problem Persist? ‘Rational Rigidity’ and the Plight of Japanese Banks

One of the most perplexing factors in the Japanese financial crisis is the apparently non‐optimal and non‐rational behaviour of Japanese banks. We provide a “rational” explanation for bank behaviour based on a theory of community banking that incorporates Japanese institutional characteristics. We find three implications of community banking – a low lending rate, a low bankruptcy rate, and in particular, institutionalisation of ‘rational rigidity’ (an institutional pledge of no profit maximisation) – in Japanese banks. We argue that this type of banking is viable as long as the economy expands and asset prices go up, which was the case before the asset‐market crash in 1990. The stagnation and free‐fall of asset prices in the 1990s exerted tremendous pressure on Japanese banks but did not paralyse them completely in the 1990s, although there are indications that they failed to restructure distressed large corporations in some sectors, notably real estate. Thus, the problem is not that paralysed banks are blocking recovery, but that their current institutionalised rigidity in banking practices is no longer viable because private enterprises in the market economy are suffering from asset‐price deflation and economic stagnation.