Apportioning the House of Representatives in 2000: The Effects of Alternative Policy Scenarios

Objective. The goal of this article is to develop and examine eight different scenarios in which the U.S. House of Representatives is reapportioned for the year 2000 on the basis of eight scenarios in which the apportionment population is differentially defined. In each scenario we adjust the 2000 apportionment population of each of the 50 states on the basis of various aspects of immigration, eligibility to vote, the overseas population, and statistical sampling. Method. The method we use to apportion the House under each of the eight scenarios is the method of Equal Proportions, a divisor method that has been used to apportion the House since 1940. It endeavors to assign equitably to the 50 states, on the basis of population size, the 385 House seats that are available to be apportioned. Not all 435 House seats are assigned to the states using this method because each state automatically gets one seat. Results. We show that when the House of Representatives is reapportioned on the basis of any of the eight scenarios, there is a varying amount of redistribution of seats among the states. Many states end up gaining or losing seats, but not all are affected. Conclusion. There have been several legal challenges following the 2000 and earlier apportionments. The results of our analyses suggest that there will continue to be legal challenges to the 2000 and later apportionments. Since it is not likely that the Congress will permit a larger number of representatives than 435, apportionment challenges are really a zero‐sum game. Some states will gain political power, and others will lose it. This redistribution of power and its politically relevant consequences lead us to expect that apportionment challenges regarding the kinds of political and demographic issues raised in this article are not at all unlikely in the future.