A Forgotten Tie Between Democracies and Nondemocracies in Asymmetric Cooperation

Objectives I examine the linkage between regime type and the durability of interstate cooperation. While scholars have argued that a pair of democracies is better than other combinations of regime types in achieving successful cooperation because of their accountable domestic institutions, I contend that less accountable institutions in nondemocracies can facilitate certain types of cooperation when states need to cede some autonomy to their cooperation partners. I expect that when cooperation necessitates multiple types of contributions, such as credible commitment and autonomy, a combination of mixed regimes can effectively achieve sustainable cooperation. Methods My argument is examined in the context of asymmetric alliances, a form of cooperation characterized by the exchange of security and autonomy between a major power and a minor power. I use data on bilateral alliances from 1816 to 2001 for empirical analysis. Results An asymmetric alliance formed between a democratic major power and a nondemocratic minor power is as durable as a joint democratic asymmetric alliance. Conclusions My findings indicate that joint democracy is not always the best combination of regime types for interstate cooperation and that there are circumstances in which nondemocracies can facilitate cooperation.