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Corruption and Reputation

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  • Svetlana Andrianova

Abstract

This paper examines corruption in a random matching game where past actions are imperfectly observed and players have the option to continue trading with their existing partners. It shows that the effect of individual reputations for honesty may outweigh the effect of a bad collective reputation depending on the expected value of a continued match relative to the corruption gain.

Suggested Citation

  • Svetlana Andrianova, 2001. "Corruption and Reputation," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 48(3), pages 245-259, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:scotjp:v:48:y:2001:i:3:p:245-259
    DOI: 10.1111/1467-9485.00197
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    Cited by:

    1. Krammer, Sorin & Jimenez, Alfredo, 2019. "Do political connections matter for firm innovation? Evidence from emerging markets in Central Asia and Eastern Europe," MPRA Paper 94942, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Camille Chaserant & Sophie Harnay, 2015. "Self-regulation of the legal profession and quality in the market for legal services: an economic analysis of lawyers’ reputation," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 39(2), pages 431-449, April.
    3. Nicolas Jacquemet, 2005. "La corruption comme une imbrication de contrats : Une revue de la littérature microéconomique," Working Papers 2005-29, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
    4. Thomas Herzfeld & Christoph Weiss, 2007. "Corruption clubs: empirical evidence from kernel density estimates," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 39(12), pages 1565-1572.
    5. Liu Qijun & Peng Yaping, 2015. "Determinants of Willingness to Bribe: Micro Evidence from the Educational Sector in China," Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), De Gruyter, vol. 235(2), pages 168-183, April.
    6. Krammer, Sorin M.S. & Jiménez, Alfredo, 2020. "Do political connections matter for firm innovation? Evidence from emerging markets in Central Asia and Eastern Europe," Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Elsevier, vol. 151(C).
    7. Rajeev K. Goel, 2013. "Initiation of corrupt exchanges and severity of corruption," Financial Theory and Practice, Institute of Public Finance, vol. 37(2), pages 207-222.

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