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Newspaper Circulation and Local Government Efficiency

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  • Christian Bruns
  • Oliver Himmler

Abstract

Whenever citizens want their elected officials to employ funds efficiently, they are in need of information in order to establish accountability. We develop an agency model with imperfect monitoring where newspapers provide voters with this information. The model predicts that an informed electorate is more likely to hold an incumbent accountable. Using panel data on Norwegian municipalities we show that increases in local newspaper circulation are associated with higher levels of local government efficiency as measured by an index introduced by the Norwegian authorities.
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Suggested Citation

  • Christian Bruns & Oliver Himmler, 2011. "Newspaper Circulation and Local Government Efficiency," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 113, pages 470-492, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:scandj:v:113:y:2011:i::p:470-492
    DOI: j.1467-9442.2010.01633.x
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H7 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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