IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/scandj/v103y2001i4p673-688.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Is Environmental Dumping Greater when Plants are Footloose?

Author

Listed:
  • Alistair Ulph
  • Laura Valentini

Abstract

We address concerns that globalisation gives national governments incentives to set weak environmental policies and that these incentives are particularly strong in industries where plants are footloose. Using a simple model of imperfect competition, we compare the environmental policies that would be set by non‐cooperative governments for two different move structures—where governments set environmental policies after firms decide where to locate (market share game) and where governments set environmental policies before firms decide where to locate (location game). We show that the extent of environmental dumping in the market share game can be greater than in the location game. JEL classification F1; H4; L5; Q2

Suggested Citation

  • Alistair Ulph & Laura Valentini, 2001. "Is Environmental Dumping Greater when Plants are Footloose?," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 103(4), pages 673-688, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:scandj:v:103:y:2001:i:4:p:673-688
    DOI: 10.1111/1467-9442.00265
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9442.00265
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/1467-9442.00265?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • F1 - International Economics - - Trade
    • H4 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods
    • L5 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy
    • Q2 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:scandj:v:103:y:2001:i:4:p:673-688. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/(ISSN)1467-9442 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.