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Discipline, Signaling, and Currency Boards

Author

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  • Maria‐Angels Oliva
  • Luis A. Rivera‐Batiz
  • Amadou N. R. Sy

Abstract

The paper models the choice between currency boards (CBs) and adjustable pegs (or managed floating). Countries adopting CBs have grown faster and inflated less on average than countries adopting other regimes. The explanation hinges on key features of CBs: policy discipline and inflation credibility. The authors find separating equilibria in which a weak government chooses a CB as a discipline device while a tough government chooses a standard peg for its policy flexibility. Paradoxically, the weak government can then outperform the tough government on average. In simulations performed, CBs welfare can exceed peg welfare even when unemployment persistence is strong.

Suggested Citation

  • Maria‐Angels Oliva & Luis A. Rivera‐Batiz & Amadou N. R. Sy, 2001. "Discipline, Signaling, and Currency Boards," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 9(4), pages 608-625, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:reviec:v:9:y:2001:i:4:p:608-625
    DOI: 10.1111/1467-9396.00303
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    Cited by:

    1. Oliver Grimm, 2007. "Fiscal Discipline and Stability under Currency Board Systems," CER-ETH Economics working paper series 07/66, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich.
    2. Switgard Feuerstein & Oliver Grimm, 2006. "On the Credibility of Currency Boards," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 14(5), pages 818-835, November.
    3. Spiegel, Mark M. & Valderrama, Diego, 2003. "Currency boards, dollarized liabilities, and monetary policy credibility," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 22(7), pages 1065-1087, December.
    4. Blagov, Boris & Funke, Michael, 2019. "The Regime-Dependent Evolution Of Credibility: A Fresh Look At Hong Kong'S Linked Exchange Rate System," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 23(6), pages 2434-2468, September.
    5. repec:zbw:bofitp:2013_024 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Blagov, Boris & Funke, Michael, 2019. "The Regime-Dependent Evolution Of Credibility: A Fresh Look At Hong Kong'S Linked Exchange Rate System," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 23(6), pages 2434-2468, September.
    7. repec:got:cegedp:36 is not listed on IDEAS

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