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Political connections in the land market: Evidence from China's state‐owned enterprises

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  • Long Wang
  • Yang Yang

Abstract

This study examines whether political connections lead state‐owned enterprises (SOEs) to behave differently from privately owned enterprises (POEs) in acquiring land parcels at auctions and explores the underlying mechanisms that drive the price premiums paid by SOEs. We find that SOEs pay 11.9% more than POEs for observably comparable land parcels at auctions, and the price premiums SOEs pay are mainly driven by wholly state‐owned enterprises (WSOEs). In particular, we provide evidence that SOEs have advance access to information about the development of land parcels in 134 state‐level special economic zones, and land parcels purchased by SOEs lead to positive stock market performance. We also show that an anti‐corruption campaign that weakens political connections and reduces the information advantage leads to a decrease in the price premiums paid by SOEs.

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  • Long Wang & Yang Yang, 2021. "Political connections in the land market: Evidence from China's state‐owned enterprises," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 49(1), pages 7-35, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:reesec:v:49:y:2021:i:1:p:7-35
    DOI: 10.1111/1540-6229.12329
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    3. Huasheng Song & Guili Sun, 2022. "Investment Promotion, Tax Competition, and Industrial Land Price in China—Evidence from the Corporate Tax Collection Reform," Land, MDPI, vol. 11(5), pages 1-17, May.
    4. Keming Li & Desmond Tsang & Zeshen Ye, 2024. "Females on Boards and Default Risk in the Chinese Real Estate Industry," International Real Estate Review, Global Social Science Institute, vol. 27(2), pages 169-202.
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    6. Gao, Fugang & Ma, Xianlei & van der Krabben, Erwin & Ploegmakers, Huub & Shi, Xiaoping, 2022. "Causes of industrial land-use regulations in China: A share tenancy perspective," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 122(C).

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