Commercial Real Estate Leasing, Asymmetric Information, and Monopolistic Competition

We model the choice of lease type, gross lease versus net lease, in an environment in which lessees have private information with respect to their expected intensity of utilization of the leased space, and in which lessors have market power with respect to the pricing of the lease. Unless the lessor can provide operating services at lower cost than the lessee, there exists a lemons problem. We examine a market in which lessors can provide operating services at lower cost. Given asymmetric information with respect to expected lessee utilization and/or damage to the leased space, the lessor offers both a gross and net lease, where the higher expected utilization lessees select the gross lease and the lower expected utilization lessees select a net lease. Lease pricing depends on both the lessor’s beliefs with respect to lessee utilization of the space and the lessor’s market power. In a monopolistic market, relative to a competitive market, a lessor charges higher rent for a gross lease relative to a net lease in order to extract a portion of the gain from shifting operating services to the lessor. Given the higher rent for a gross lease, a smaller proportion of lessees (only very high utilization lessees) selects a gross lease in a monopolistic market. Therefore, the expected cost savings associated with shifting operating services/provision of maintenance to the lessor are smallest in a monopolistic market.