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What Do Rental Contracts Reveal About Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in Rental Housing Markets?

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  • John D. Benjamin
  • Kenneth M. Lusht
  • James D. Shilling

Abstract

This article examines the pricing of rental contracts for two types of renter households: those who are able to amass a large, up‐front security deposit and those with little, or no, security to offer. Empirical tests are presented to suggest that, in dealing with renter households who have little, or no, security to offer, landlords earn at a similar rate of return as lenders who make riskier loans at a high interest rate to borrowers of dubious credit. The analysis suggests that this situation occurs in large part because of the problem of asymmetric information and moral hazard between landlords and renter households regarding the latter's use of the premises.

Suggested Citation

  • John D. Benjamin & Kenneth M. Lusht & James D. Shilling, 1998. "What Do Rental Contracts Reveal About Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in Rental Housing Markets?," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 26(2), pages 309-329, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:reesec:v:26:y:1998:i:2:p:309-329
    DOI: 10.1111/1540-6229.00747
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    Cited by:

    1. Ramon Sotelo, 2001. "Foundations of Home Ownership Policy - The Implementation of the Financing of Use as an Independent Finance Level," ERES eres2001_281, European Real Estate Society (ERES).
    2. Daniel Broxterman & Tingyu Zhou, 2023. "Information Frictions in Real Estate Markets: Recent Evidence and Issues," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 66(2), pages 203-298, February.
    3. Barker, David, 2003. "Length of residence discounts, turnover, and demand elasticity. Should long-term tenants pay less than new tenants?," Journal of Housing Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 1-11, March.
    4. Henry Schneider, 2010. "Moral Hazard in Leasing Contracts: Evidence from the New York City Taxi Industry," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 53(4), pages 783-805.
    5. Genesove, David & Hoffmann, Eran & Elster, Yael, 2020. "Agreements Must Be Kept? Residential Leases during Covid-19," CEPR Discussion Papers 15102, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    6. Park, Sung Sik & Pyun, Ju Hyun, 2020. "Between two extreme practices of rent-only and deposit-only leases in Korea: Default risk vs. cost of capital," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(C).
    7. Arbel, Yuval & Fialkoff, Chaim & Kerner, Amichai, 2017. "Removal of renter's illusion: Property tax compliance among renters and owner-occupiers," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(C), pages 150-174.
    8. Randy E. Dumm & Charles Nyce & G. Stacy Sirmans & Greg T. Smersh, 2022. "Pricing Moral Hazard in Residential Properties: The Impact of Sinkhole Claims on House Prices," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 64(1), pages 30-70, January.

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