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The Housing Market and Real Estate Brokers

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  • Suryamani Mantrala
  • Edward Zabel

Abstract

The major development in this paper concerns the failure, in earlier studies, to consider interaction between alternative methods of arranging sales in the housing market. A seller may market a house by direct negotiations with buyers, without the intermediation of real estate brokers, or by listing the house with a broker. A rational seller would choose the option which offers the higher expected return on the house. In a sequence of models we argue that the seller's option of a method of sale induces competitive pressure in the choice of the commission rate by the broker. We also consider the split rate in a multiple listing system, ease of entry of brokers and the cartel hypothesis as applied to brokers. We conclude that the competitive pressure of direct negotiations between sellers and buyers, relative free entry of brokers and the inappropri‐ateness of the cartel hypothesis cast serious doubt about a general consensus of opinion that the brokerage system is characterized by price fixing, excessive commissions and excessive marketing costs.

Suggested Citation

  • Suryamani Mantrala & Edward Zabel, 1995. "The Housing Market and Real Estate Brokers," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 23(2), pages 161-185, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:reesec:v:23:y:1995:i:2:p:161-185
    DOI: 10.1111/1540-6229.00662
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    Cited by:

    1. Abdullah Yavas, 2001. "Impossibility of a Competitive Equilibrium in the Real Estate Brokerage Industry," Journal of Real Estate Research, American Real Estate Society, vol. 21(3), pages 187-200.
    2. James R. Webb, 2000. "An Inquiry into the Professional Self Image of Real Estate Agents," Journal of Real Estate Research, American Real Estate Society, vol. 20(1), pages 153-177.
    3. Timothy E. Jares & James E. Larsen & Thomas S. Zorn, 2000. "An Optimal Incentive System For Real Estate Agents," Journal of Real Estate Research, American Real Estate Society, vol. 20(1), pages 49-59.
    4. Larceneux, Fabrice & Lefebvre, Thomas & Simon, Arnaud, 2015. "What added value do estate agents offer compared to FSBO transactions? Explanation from a perceived advantages model," Journal of Housing Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(C), pages 72-82.
    5. Carolin Fritzsche & Lars Vandrei, 2018. "Causes of Vacancies in the Housing Market – A Literature Review," ifo Working Paper Series 258, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich.
    6. Kimberly Goodwin & Ken Johnson & Leonard Zumpano, 2012. "Minimum Service Requirements, Limited Brokers and Menuing of Services," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 45(2), pages 471-490, August.
    7. Kimberly F. Luchtenberg & Michael J. Seiler & Hua Sun, 2019. "Listing Agent Signals: Does a Picture Paint a Thousand Words?," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 59(4), pages 617-648, November.
    8. Jonathan Wiley & Justin Benefield & Marcus Allen, 2014. "Cyclical Determinants of Brokerage Commission Rates," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 48(1), pages 196-219, January.
    9. Marcus T. Allen & William H. Dare & Lingxiao Li, 2018. "MLS Information Sharing Intensity and Housing Market Outcomes," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 57(2), pages 297-313, August.

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